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This article summarizes the EEC Directive On Products Liability'
and related legislation pending in the Netherlands. 2 The Directive and
the Dutch Draft contain several substantive provisions which parallel
doctrine in the United States. Based on an analysis of the American
experience, we argue that the Directive and the Dutch Draft do not
substantially expand the ability of injured persons to recover damages
from the producers of defective products. Economic factors, limited
discovery, and nonuniform procedural rules will retard the development
of doctrinal harmony and an increased level of consumer protection
within the EEC.
I. INTRODUCTION
Products liability, an American invention,3 today preoccupies legis-
lators and jurists throughout the industrialized world. In the United
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I The Council Directive of July 25, 1985 on the Approximation of the Laws,
Regulations, and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Lia-
bility for Defective Products [hereinafter EEC Directive], 28 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No.
L 210) 29 (1985); 7 PRODUCTS LIartrrY INTERNATIONAL 135 (September 1985) (The
complete text of the EEC Directive is reproduced in Appendix A).
2 Draft Products Liability Act of 1986, Tweede Kamer (House of Representatives)
vergaderjaar (draft) 1985-86, par. 19,636, nos. 1-3 (Neth. 1985-86) [hereinafter Dutch
Draft].
I Legal systems in Europe have provided relief to purchasers of defective goods
for centuries. The remedies typically have involved tort, contract or some hybrid.
Nevertheless, the modern understanding of the terms "products liability" is associated
with the adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A and the evolution
of case law in the United States. See Boger, The Harmonization of European Products
Liability Law, 7 FoRDHAM INT'L L. J. 1, 2 (1983-84).
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States, the majority of the combined legislative and judicial energy
expended in recent years4 has focused upon reform measures which
limit plaintiffs' rights and correspondingly narrow the scope or mag-
nitude of the responsibility of manufacturers and sellers of defective
products.5 Federal legislative activity commenced in 1979 with the prom-
ulgation of the Model Uniform Products Liability Act (MUPLA).6
Almost every session of Congress since the development of MUPLA
has included discussion of some form of national products liability
legislation. 7 State legislatures and supreme courts have recently narrowed
plaintiffs' rights through reformulated substantive definitions,8 new pro-
cedural obstacles, 9 and modification of the traditional rules of law
governing damages. 10
Similar considerations of predictability, equality, compensation, and
accident avoidance" underpin products liability law in both the United
4 Twerski, A Moderate And Restrained Federal Product Liability Bill: Targeting
The Crisis Areas For Resolution, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 575, 579-82 (1985). For
discussions of recent judicial and legislative efforts, see Prentiss v. Yale and Towne
Mfg., Co., 421 Mich. 670, 680-91, 365 N.W.2d 176, 180-86 (1985).
Notwithstanding this general trend, several innovative decisions have expanded
the ability of victims of toxic torts and defective pharmaceutical products to recover
damages. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d. 588, 607 P.2d 924, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J.
191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982) (Defendant manufacturer precluded from asserting the
state-of-the-art defense against the plaintiffs in a strict liability, failure to warn case).
But see Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984) (Beshada
restricted to its facts. Strict liability applies to drug manufacturers, but defendants
may plead and prove that the information necessary to identify the defect was not
available).
I Uniform Products Liability Act, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979) [here-
inafter MUPLA]. See Schwartz, The Uniform Products Liability Act-A Brief Over-
view, 33 VAND. L. REv. 579 (1980), for a brief discussion of the history of the Act.
See Twerski, supra note 4.
Prentiss, 421 Mich. at 670. Here, the Michigan Supreme Court redefined the
standard of liability in design defect cases.
I See 5 ALA. CODE § 6-5-502 (Supp. 1987) (imposing a one-year limitations period
from the date of injury).
,0 See 5 ALA. CODE § 6-5-520 (Supp. 1987) (This section modifies the collateral
source rule to ensure that, plaintiffs do not receive compensation more than once
for the same medical and hospital expenses); 5 ALA. CODE § 6-5-522 (Supp. 1987)
(This section renders evidence of payments from collateral sources admissible); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-225d (West Supp. 1987) (This section provides that damages
for future economic and non-economic loss in excess of two hundred thousand
dollars may be paid in installment payments).
1l Accident avoidance includes the deterrence of both manufacturer and consumer
conduct which contributes to products liability accidents. A frequently mentioned
rationale for the adoption of strict liability and comparative negligence is that each
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States and Europe. As a result of these common concerns and the
increasing number of international transactions, the substantive law in
this area in both regions, whether grounded in tort or contract, tends
toward uniformity. The recent adoption by the EEC of its Directive
on Products Liability, which incorporates many features of products
liability law in the United States, illustrates this trend.1 2 Europe, how-
ever, appears to be expanding the rights of injured plaintiffs.
The EEC Directive has been the subject of much discussion.,3 Typ-
ically, publications compare the substantive doctrine in several EEC
member states and discuss the potential impact of the Directive. The
commentators appear to be in accord that harmonization of the law
throughout the EEC is a beneficial goal and that the Directive will
facilitate harmonization. Whether the incorporation of the Directive
into the substantive law of the individual member states will actually
expand the substantive rights of injured consumers is more problematic.
For example, Reich argues that the American experience has had a
conservative influence on Europe and that harmonization is "intended
to stifle too far reaching member states' initiatives based upon the U.S.
model.'
4
encourages accident-avoidance behavior. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278
Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976) (The manufacturer is in the best position to avoid
the accident and injury). See also R. POSNER, ECONObIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW,
123-124 (2d ed. 1977) (The conduct of the plaintiff in relation to the burden of
preventing the accident must also be considered if the Learned Hand BPL formula
is to operate fairly and efficiently in determining liability).
12 It is often stated that imitation is the highest form of flattery. The adoption
by the EEC of essential principles of United States products liability law might
arguably be construed as a ratification of their validity. As we seek to demonstrate,
substantive principles may mean vastly different things from one country to the
next. Historical dispute patterns and the procedural frameworks in the United States
and throughout the member states of the EEC may largely determine how the
principles are employed and interpreted.
31 See Albanese and Ducas, Developments in European Product Liability, 5 DICK.
J. INT'L L. 193 (1987); van Catwijck, Products Liability In Europe, 34 Am. J. OF
Copr. L. 789 (1986); Dielmann, The European Economic Community's Council
Directive on Products Liability, 20 INT'L L. 1391 (1986). Reich, Product Safety and
Product Liability -An Analysis of the EEC Council Directive of 25 July 1985 on
the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations, and Administrative Provisions of the
Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products, 9 J. CONSUMER POLICY
133 (1986); Bourgorgnie, Product Liability: Old Arguments for a New Debate?, 1
E R. CONSUMER L. J. 6 (1986); Shettler, Products Liability: A Comparison Of U.S.
And EEC Approaches, 13 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & COM. 155, 156, 173-83 (1986).
14 See Reich, supra note 13, at 136; But see Maddox, Towards a Regime of Strict
Liability, 19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 508, 510 (Sept./Oct. 1985) (Maddox argues that
the Directive furthers consumer protection and fair competition).
19881
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
The issues of compensation and accident avoidance can be addressed
on a societal scale in any number of ways. We assume that dispute
patterns from one country to another have a national character that
is shaped by factors including: alternative avenues of redress; perceptions
of the legal system; quantitative or structural factors; and the availability
of alternative compensation approaches such as social insurance. These
elements along with the procedural rules compose what has been termed
the "legal culture."' 5
This article analyzes the incorporation of the EEC Directive into the
law of the Netherlands in order to evaluate the impact of the Directive
in both a general and specific sense. As pertains to Dutch law, we
argue that the Directive involves a negligible expansion of the rights
of injured consumers. This conclusion as to the impact of the Directive
in one member state lends support to our conclusion that the overall
Directive minimally advances its express goal of harmonization of the
law and provides little benefit to the consumer.
Part II is a summary of that section of the Dutch Civil Code which
is the tort law basis for most products liability claims. The dominant
trends within the United States are also briefly discussed. Part III
reviews the main provisions of the EEC Directive and the Dutch Draft,
concluding that their substantive terms and problems in drafting make
harmonization of the law problematic. Part IV briefly summarizes the
economic and procedural elements which compose the legal culture in
the Netherlands and lays the basis for evaluating whether the new
legislation advances consumer interests. Part V concludes that the Di-
rective does not substantially expand consumer protection within the
EEC and that the Dutch Draft merely codifies the existing case authority
construing Sec. 1401 of the current Dutch Civil Code.
II. PRODUCTS LIABLrrY IN TmE NETERLANDs
Generally, European courts scrutinize proof of causation more closely
than proof of negligence.' 6 The Dutch courts' activity in the area of
11 See Friedman, Legal Culture and the Welfare State, in DLEMMAS OF LAW IN
THE WELFARE STATE 13, 17 (G. Teubuer ed. 1986). Lawrence M. Friedman states
"By legal cuture, we mean the ideas, attitudes, values, and beliefs that people hold
about the legal system (cite omitted). Not that any particular country has a single
unified legal culture." Id. at 17. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What
We Know and Don't Know (AND THINK WE KNOW) About Our Allegedly
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 4, 58-61 (1983). The
organization of legal services and access to the legal professions are determinants
of litigation patterns.
16 See Reich, supra note 13, at 134.
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products liability reflects this general tendency. Products liability, as a
component of private law, has expanded significantly during the past
thirty years. This expansion has largely been achieved by the courts
through a relaxation of the plaintiff's burden of proof. In some instances
the defendant must now shoulder the burden of proving freedom from
fault. 17
The bedrock of products liability law in the Netherlands is section
1401 BW 18 which provides: "Every unlawful act that inflicts damage
upon another obliges the person by whose fault the damage is caused
to indemnify the other person."' 9 An unlawful act has been defined
in a much celebrated decision of the Dutch Supreme Court as conduct
which: (a) breaches a statutory duty; (b) infringes upon the rights of
another; (c) is contrary to good morals; or (d) is contrary to the
carefulness regarding another's person or property required in society. 20
The plaintiff's burden of proof in tort includes four elements: unlaw-
fulness, fault, causation, and damage. 21 Fault constitutes the subjective
element of the unlawful act, ensuring that the actor is responsible for
his conduct. This interpretation of section 1401 was the starting point
for an unprecedented growth in case law which has made tort law one
of the major subjects of private law in the Netherlands. 22
In 1957, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals rendered an opinion
suggesting that the plaintiff need not prove fault. 23 That case involved
a collision between a Ford van and a motorcyclist. The van apparently
failed to remain in the proper driving lane due to a manufacturing
defect in the steering column assembly.2 Ford Netherlands denied any
See Judgment of June 27, 1957, Hof Amsterdam, [NJ] 104 (1958). The five
intermediate appellate courts (Gerechtshof) are cited with the prefix "Hof" followed
by the name of the city in which the court sits.
IS BW (Burgerlijk Wetboek) indicates the Civil Code of the Netherlands; NBW
(Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek) indicates the New Civil Code of the Netherlands.
19 H. TEBBENS, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCT LIABILITY: A STUDY OF COMPARATIVE
AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 101 (1979).
20 Judgment of January 31, 1919, HR, NJ 161. HR indicates the Hoge Raad der
Nederlanden which is the Supreme Court of the Netherlands. There are nineteen
general trial courts, called Arrondissementsrechtbank and cited as "Rb.", and sixty-
two District Courts, called Kantongerecht and cited as "Ktg.". The District Courts
are limited to matters involving five thousand Dutch Guilders (approximately two
thousand and five hundred dollars in U.S. currency) or less, landlord-tenant cases,
and labor cases.
21 See FOKKEMA & HOND'US, INTRODUCTION TO DUTCH LAW 138 (1978); ASSER-
RUTTEN-HARTKAMP III (1986).
22 See FOKKEMA & HONDIUS, supra note 21.
23 Judgment of June 27, 1957, Hof Amsterdam, NJ 104 (1958).
24 An element of the steering assembly, the tail-feather, was not properly riveted
to the steering wheel.
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fault, arguing that the relevant components were supplied by Ford of
America and that inspection by Ford Netherlands was economically
unfeasible and should not be required. The court considered the defect
to be clearly observable and serious, indicating that Ford Netherlands
acted at its own peril when it failed to perform intensive inspections
of components supplied by Ford of America. Moreover, the court
rejected Ford Netherlands' argument that the economics of its business
did not permit such inspections. This decision by the Amsterdam Court
of Appeals, however, was not binding on all courts in the Netherlands.Y
However, the Dutch Supreme Court in a 1973 decision adopted the
approach to manufacturing defects established in the Ford case. 26 In
this case, a hot water bottle, allegedly equipped with a locking device
to prevent leaking, severely burned a baby. A nurse who came to the
home to assist with the baby failed to read the instructions prior to
using the hot water bottle. The defendant argued that it is always
possible that a bottle will leak and that the nurse's failure to follow
the instructions and check the bottle was the cause of the accident.
Both the trial court and the court of appeals rejected the plaintiff's
claim. The trial court found that a reasonable person would have been
aware of the danger created by the hot water bottle. 27 In affirming the
trial court, the court of appeals noted the possibility of leakage from
a hot water bottle is widely known and elimination of such possibility
would have been very difficult, if not impossible. The Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals and held that the lower courts should
have addressed the issue of whether the danger presented by the hot
water bottle was sufficient to preclude its sale. 8 The Supreme Court
also stated that a manufacturer must foresee imprudent users and that
placement of a warning upon a dangerously defective product is in-
sufficient. Although the court did not expressly relax the plaintiff's
burden of proof, the case is now regularly cited for the proposition
25 Other Dutch courts did not follow the decision of the Hof Amsterdam. See
Judgment of December 21, 1967, Hof Den Bosch, NJ 402 (1968); Judgment of
November 11, 1969, Rb. Breda, NJ 315 (1971).
26 Judgment of February 2, 1973, HR, NJ 315.
27 See id.
28 Subsequently, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals found that the hot water bottle
presented a foreseeable danger and that it should not have been marketed. Judgment
of March 1, 1974, Hof Amsterdam, NJ 486. The opinion of the Supreme Court is
also interesting because the court apparently believed a manufacturing defect was
involved despite the defendant's argument that it was possible for any of its products
to leak.
[Vol. 18:391
EUROPEAN PRODUCTS LIABILITY DIRECTIVE
that the defendant must demonstrate non-negligence in a products
liability case involving a manufacturing defect. 29
The extent to which Dutch law reverses the burden of proof in
products liability cases involving defective-design or failure-to-warn claims
is obscured by a dearth of case law.30 One appellate court decision
suggested that the plaintiff must carry the burden of proof in a case
alleging the failure to properly warn or instruct.3' In this case, the
plaintiff sustained an eye injury while painting his ceiling with a product
containing gypsum and lime. The plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer
should have provided a warning. The court found for the defendant,
indicating that the effects of gypsum and lime are commonly known.
This language suggests a reasonable consumer standard for failure-to-
warn claims in products liability cases.
In a recent decision involving alleged defects in the prescription drug
Halcion, a trial court rendered an opinion indicating that the plaintiff
in a design or warning case must prove fault.32 Halcion is manufactured
by Upjohn, an American pharmaceutical company. The plaintiffs al-
leged that they suffered from damaging side effects of Halcion, including
addiction to the drug.3" The plaintiffs raised both design and warning
claims. The court found that Halcion was not defective by its nature
nor by the manner in which it was presented to the consuming public.
In reaching its decision, the court balanced the beneficial effects of
Halcion with the risks associated with its use and indicated that some
side effects must be accepted. Significantly, the court reviewed the
standard set forth in the EEC Directive 3 and held: (a) the risk of
detrimental side effects for a registered drug must be accepted;35 (b)
29 See SCHUT, PRODUKTENAANSPRAKELIJKHEiD 236-39 (1974).
30 The Supreme Court has rendered two written opinions in the past 50 years.
Judgment of April 6, 1933, HR, NJ 881 and Judgment of February 2, 1973, HR,
NJ 315. The lower courts have rendered not more than twenty-five opinions in the
same period of time. G.SNUJDERS, PRODUKTVEILIGHEID EN AANSPRAKELI.KHEID 150
(1987).
11 Judgment of November 13, 1979, Hof Den Bosch, NJ 370 (1980).
32 Judgment of June 28, 1984, Rb. Arnhem, 2 TvC. 82 (1985).
13 The main active ingredient in Halcion is benzopdiazapan which is commonly
found in tranquilizers and sleeping medication.
14 The Court reviewed Section 4 of the revised draft of the EEC Directive of
1979. Section 4 stated: "A product is defective, if while used or consumed for its
intended purpose, it fails to provide the safety to persons or goods which the user
is entitled to expect, taking all of the circumstances into account, including the
presentation of the product and the time when the product was put into circulation."
G. SNUDERS, supra note 30, at 191, n. 200.
31 The statute providing for the registration of drugs is the WET OP DE GENEES-
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Halcion was admitted into many other countries subsequent to the
Dutch complaints; (c) there was no unacceptable risk when used ac-
cording to Upjohn's instructions; and (d) Upjohn exercised the requisite
level of carefulness regarding the foreseeable side effects of Halcion. 36
The court of appeals reversed the trial court and ordered further
proceedings consistent with its opinion.3 7 The court first noted the serious
nature of the side effects, including loss of memory, panic, suicidal
ideation, and substantial headaches. Given the risk of these side effects,
the court stated that it suspected the defect of the I milligram tablets
resulted from the excessive size of the dosage. The court also noted
that the .25 and .5 milligram tablets of Halcion were defective if the
accompanying instructions were inadequate. The court, however, re-
frained from holding that the 1 milligram tablet was defective and
ordered the selection of three expert witnesses: a drug expert, a psy-
chiatrist, and a family doctor. The court indicated that the resolution
of the defect issue would depend upon the expert determination of
whether the 1 milligram dosage of Halcion caused the plaintiff's injuries.
The decision of the court of appeals in the Halcion case is instructive
for several reasons.38 The court stated that a product is defective when
it fails to provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect under
the circumstances; a consumer is not expected to be aware of side
effects not included in warnings or instructions. Despite the similarity
in the language used by the court and the language of Article 6 of the
EEC Directive, the court found that the Directive was not applicable,
indicating a reluctance to anticipate the Dutch Legislature's adoption
of a strict liability approach to product defects. The decision also
confirms that the burden of proof in a warning or design defect case
is not relaxed under current Dutch law. This approach is consistent
with Article 7 of the EEC Directive which requires that the proven
MIDDELENVOORZIENMNGEN 1958, [S.] 408 (1958). Under its provisions most drugs must
be approved by a government agency. Registration appears to be a process designed
to ensure that a drug meets minimum standards. Vitamins are currently exempt
from registration.
36 Judgment of June 28, 1984, Rb. Arnhem, 2 TvC. 82 (1985).
11 Judgment of July 7, 1987, Hof Arnhem, 4 TvC. 272.
11 The Halcion case is also significant because it clearly assumes that a manu-
facturer of pharmaceutical products has a duty to warn the ultimate consumer. This
sharply contrasts with the "learned intermediary" theory currently in vogue in the
United States. See Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Odgers v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 419
Mich. 686, 358 N.W.2d 873 (1984). The Halcion case is currently on appeal to the
Dutch Supreme Court.
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risks be balanced against all of the relevant circumstances, including
the manner in which the drug is prescribed, the content of the warning
or instructions, the probability of injury, and the utility or benefit of
the product. Additionally, the court's selection of experts illustrates the
power of the Dutch judiciary to maintain control over litigation. This
tight control of the expert selection process exemplifies the difference
between products liability litigation in the Netherlands and the United
States. 9
Some cases suggest that the burden of proving fault may be relaxed
in express warranty cases. The principal case in this area was based
on section 1401 of the Civil Code. The defendant, a supplier of glue,
advertised that its special glue was appropriate for drain pipe connec-
tions. The glue, which was purchased by a Dutch municipality, did
not perform as advertised. The Court found the defendant supplier
liable as a result of the defendant's advertisements. The Supreme Court
further found the defendant liable for failure to prove freedom from
fault.
The lack of appellate authority and the independence of the judiciary
obscure the limits of products liability doctrine in the Netherlands.
Civil law countries such as the Netherlands do not adhere to the doctrine
of stare decisis.40 A decision of the Supreme Court is, strictly speaking,
not binding on the lower courts in future cases. Nevertheless, the
reported cases demonstrate a pattern of cautious expansion of the rights
of injured consumers over the past thirty years. Opinions establishing
that the plaintiff need not prove fault, or that fault is inferable from
the existence of a defect and the surrounding circumstances, parallel
the approach taken in the United States. 41
39 A Dutch litigant's ability to present evidence through both experts and lay
witnesses is controlled by the court. A party desirous of calling a witness at trial
must obtain the permission of the court. Rv. § 199 et seq. (citation to the Wetboek
van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering, the Dutch code of civil procedure). The court may
deny such requests unless the proffered testimony is relevant to an essential fact in
dispute. The judge, on his own initiative, may also order that an expert witness be
selected. Selection remains in the control of the parties if they can agree to either
one or three experts. Rv. § 222 et seq.
4o ComPARATwE LAW, CASEs-TEXT-MATERLAIS, 597-99 (Schlesinger, Baade, Da-
maska & Herzog eds. 1988). The editors carefully note, however, that this general
proposition must be qualified in several aspects. Id. It is also important to note
that American courts do not always strictly follow the doctrine of stare decisis.
41 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d
436 (1944); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897
(1963).
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The reluctance of the court in the Halcion case to impose strict
liability on Upjohn also mirrors current doctrinal developments in the
United States. In both the Netherlands and the United States, a con-
sensus is developing that design defect cases test the decision-making
process and judgments of the defendant manufacturer. In such cases,
the finder of fact must weigh the choices made by the defendant against
the practical and feasible alternatives existing at the time the product
left the control of the manufacturer. 4 Thus, design claims and warning
claims are subjected to a negligence standard. A strict liability approach
is only warranted with manufacturing defect claims and express warranty
claims.
III. Tim EEC DmECIVE AND THE NETHERLANDS DRAFT BILL
A. Content of the Directive and the Dutch Draft
The EEC Council promulgated the final Directive on Products Liability
on July 25, 1985. 41 The Directive had undergone numerous revisions
since the first draft in 1974, and promulgation of the Directive in 1985
was unanticipated since debate on such issues as the state of the art
defense (commonly referred to in Europe as the "development risk"
defense) and monetary limitations on liability had impeded the progress
of the draft Directive. As is customary with EEC legislation, the
Directive provides the member states with a period of time within which
to conform their national laws to the directive's terms." The Dutch
legislature, subsequent to the promulgation of the EEC Directive, has
taken a draft products liability law under advisement which includes
all of the provisions required by the EEC Directive.
Under the Directive and the Dutch Draft, a product is defective when
it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect,
taking into account all of the surrounding circumstances, including the
representation of the product, the use to which the product can rea-
sonably be expected to be put, and the time when the product was
42 See Prentiss v. Yale Mfg. Co., 421 Mich. 670, 365 N.W. 2d 176 (1985); Section
104(c) Uniform Products Liability Act, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979);
Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence to Strict Liability
to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593, 610 (1980).
41 EEC Directive, supra note 1.
" Member states must have conformed their national laws by August 1, 1988.
Id. at art. 19.
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placed into circulation. 4 A product is not considered defective solely
because a better product is subsequently marketed.4
Manufacturers (producers) are strictly liable for damage caused by
manufacturing defects. 47 Paragraph 6 of the preamble expressly states
that liability without fault is the "sole means of adequately solving"
the problems associated with complex products in a technological age.
Paragraph 11 provides, however, that a producer may escape liability
under certain circumstances specified in Article 7 of the Directive. Of
particular importance is Article 7(e) which provides a "state of the
art" defense. Neither the preamble nor the Directive expressly limit
Article 7(e) to merely design cases, and it is thus technically possible,
under the Directive, for a producer to assert a "state of the art" defense
in a case involving a manufacturing flaw. This construction of the
Directive, however, is at odds with the above-mentioned language of
the preamble to the effect that liability without fault is an essential
element of the Directive.
The Directive and Draft both contain a provision which establishes
a minimum damage threshold of 500 European Currency Units (ECUs).4
Damage is defined as death, personal injury, and property damage. 49
Damage to property caused by a defective product used professionally
is not compensable.5 0 The Directive, and hence the Draft, do not
authorize compensation for non-material damages such as pain and
suffering. The Directive allows each member state to establish a limit
on the liability of a producer for any single product involving "similar"
claims of defect and "similar" injuries of not less than 70 million
ECU.5 ' The Dutch Draft does not include this limitation.
A producer includes (a) the manufacturer of a finished product or
component part, (b) the producer of any raw material, or (c) any person
41 Id. at art. 6; Dutch Draft, supra note 2, at § 1407b.
46 EEC Directive, supra note 1, at art. 6.1(c)(2); Dutch Draft, supra note 2, at
§ 1407b.
41 See EEC Directive, supra note 1, at arts. 6-7; Dutch Draft, supra note 2, at
§§ 1407a, 1047b. See also Preamble to the European Products Liability Directive,
EEC Directive, supra note 1, at Appendix A.
48 EEC Directive, supra note 1, at art. 9(b); Dutch Draft, supra note 2, at §
1407e; See also Paragraphs 6 and 11 of the Preamble to the EEC Directive, EEC
Directive, supra note 1, at Appendix A.
49 EEC Directive, supra note 1, at art. 9(a),(b); Dutch Draft, supra note 2, at §
1407e.
10 EEC Directive, supra note 1, at art. 9(b); Dutch Draft, supra note 2, at §
1407e.
1 EEC Directive, supra note 1, at art. 16.1.
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who by placing his name, trademark, or other distinguishing feature
on the product represents himself as its producer.12 An importer or
supplier can also be deemed the producer of a defective product where
the actual producer is unknown.13 Neither the Directive nor the Draft
makes any provision for cases where the foreign producer is known
but insolvent or otherwise judgment proof. In cases where a foreign
producer is insolvent, the supplier is not subject to the Directive if it
complies with Article 3.3. This article merely requires that a supplier
provide "the injured person" with the "identity of the producer or
the person who supplied him with the product." Article 3.3 further
stipulates that in the event an imported product causes injury and the
product does not indicate the name of the importer, the importer must
also identify the producer or supplier of the product to the "injured
person." Article 3.3 makes no reference to insolvency. Thus, supplying
the identity of an insolvent producer or other person would appear to
fully meet its terms.
In addition, the producer and hence the supplier and importer are
not subject to the terms of the Directive where the state of scientific
knowledge was not sufficient at the time of circulation of the product
to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered. Component
suppliers are also completely immune where the defect is attributable
to the design of the product manufacturer's design or instructions.
The defenses available to a producer substantially parallel defenses
available in many states of the United States.M The Directive and Draft
each provide a three year statute of limitations on claims.5 The lim-
itation period commences on the day the plaintiff becomes aware or
reasonably should have been aware of the damage, the defect, and the
identity of the producer.5 6 The Directive and Draft each contain ten
year statutes of repose.57 In addition, a defendant producer may relieve
itself of liability by showing: (1) it did not place the product in "cir-
culation"; (2) the defect did not exist at the time the product was
placed in circulation; (3) the producer is not a professional producer;
52 Id. at art. 3; Dutch Draft, supra note 2, at § 1407c.
11 EEC Directive, supra note 1, at art. 3.3.
54 E.g., statutes of limitations, subsequent modification, statutes of repose, char-
acterization of the defendant as a product seller, causation, etc. See generally 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABrry 17-64 (1987); FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, 2A
PRODUCTS LLABrry §§ 16C[l-[3] (1987).
1 EEC Directive, supra note 1, at art. 10; Dutch Draft, supra note 2, at § 1407f.
56 Id.
17 EEC Directive, supra note 1, at art. 11; Dutch Draft, supra note 2, at § 1407f.
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or (4) the defect is attributable to compliance of the product with
mandatory regulations issued by public authorities.5 8 In addition, the
Directive allows each member state to elect whether to allow a defendant
producer to claim as a defense that the state of scientific and technical
knowledge at the time when the product was placed into circulation
was not sufficient to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered.
In Europe this defense is known as the "development risk" defense
and should logically have application in the area of drug products.
Some authors claim that "development risk" is distinguishable from
consideration of the "state of the art" because the former is not a
part of the balancing which is essential to determine whether a product
was defective at the time it left the control of the manufacturer. 59
According to this view, consideration of development risk involves only
the question of whether the defect was discoverable.
B. Analysis of the harmonizing effects of the Directive and Dutch
Draft
The aims of the Directive (and presumably the Draft) as stated in
its preamble are as follows:
(1) The prevention of unfair competition caused by the different
product liability rules of law among the member states;
(2) The elimination of obstructions in the free movement of goods;
(3) The protection of the consumer; and
(4) The just allocation of the risks between the consumer and the
producer of products.60
There is no empirical evidence that divergent rules of products liability
law have provided a substantial obstacle to the free movement of goods
within the EEC. Similarly, the debate within the EEC regarding the
relationship of products liability rules to unfair competition produced
18 EEC Directive, supra note 1, at arts. 1 & 7; Dutch Draft, supra note 2, at §
1407a.
19 Howells, United Kingdom's Consumer Protection Act 1987 - The Implemen-
tation of E.C. Directive on Product Liability, 3 EuR. CONSUMER L. J. 159, 164
(1987). "The development risks defense applies when the product is defective, but
there was no means of discovering the defect when it was put into circulation." Id.
But see Dielmann, The European Economic Community's Council Directive on
Product Liability, 20 INT'L LAW. 1391, 1395-96 (1986). This appears, at least with
respect to design defects, to be a distinction without a difference. Assuming a useful
product and a design which involves a threatened harm which is unknowable at the
time the product is circulated, the likely result is that the designer is not negligent
and hence the product is not defective.
- See, EEC Directive, supra note 1, at Preamble.
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no substantial empirical proofs. While it is certainly theoretically pos-
sible, and perhaps probable, that divergent standards of liability provide
some producers with a competitive advantage, this proposition has not
been proven. The goals related to unfair competition and the free
movement of goods appear merely theoretical and are therefore not at
the essence of the EEC's concern. Thus, the principal focus of the
Directive appears to be the expansion of consumer protection. This
aim necessarily involves the allocation of risk between the producer
and consumer and hence the burden of proof in products liability claims
of both a complex and simple nature. The extent to which the aim of
consumer protection is furthered will provide the benchmark of the
Directive's success or failure.
Harmonization of the law is a critical step in achieving a common
and expanded level of consumer protection within the EEC. Absent
some unifying principles or theories of recovery, legal recourse against
the producer of a defective product may vary with the national origin
of the producer and consumer and the situs of the accident and injury.
The Directive is intended to supplement the law of the member
states.6' If the terms of the Directive are clear, it should follow that
each member state would have at least one common theory of liability
in products liability cases. Therefore, the Directive can be evaluated in
terms of the degree to which it provides a doctrinal least common
denominator. A number of problems with the Directive and Draft,
with inconsistent procedural law, and with national differences in dispute
patterns raise serious doubts about the prospects of uniformity of law
and substantial improvement in the level of consumer protection within
the EEC.
The Dutch Draft and the Directive create several problems of inter-
pretation. For example, both repeatedly use the term "circulation"
without clarification 2 It is not clear whether a prescription drug is put
61 The Preamble states: "Whereas under the legal systems of the Member States
an injured party may have a claim for damages based on grounds of contractual
liability or on grounds of non-contractual liability other than that provided for in
this Directive; in so far as these provisions also serve to attain the objective of
effective protection of consumers, they should remain unaffected by this Direc-
tive ... ." Id.
62 Article 7 of the Directive and Section 1407a of the Draft state, in pertinent
part: "The producer shall not be liable as a result of this Directive if he proves:
(a) that he did not put the product into circulation; or (b) that, having regard to
the circumstances, it is probable that the defect which caused the damage did not
exist at the time when the product was put into circulation by him ... ; or (e) that
the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when he put the product
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into circulation at the time of shipment to a pharmacy, at the time of
distribution to an intermediary distributor, or at the time of sale to a
consumer. 3 Similarly, the legislation fails to define the kind of activity
which constitutes circulation of a product. Is the distribution of a
sample for purposes of market tests sufficient, or must there be a sale?
Does a gift or donation constitute circulation of a product? Does
transmission of a product to a laboratory for purposes of testing
constitute circulation?"
Article 11 of the Directive, which provides a ten year statute of
repose, also contains the term "circulation." 65 In addition to the obvious
hardship for plaintiffs who sustain injury from a product defect which
has a long latency period, e.g., drugs or durable goods such as an
automobile, the provision is subject to divergent interpretations as to
when the period of repose commences. The possible solutions to the
problems of construction created by use of the term "circulation" are
not at issue. However, the term invites the development of divergent
substantive standards. 66 The Directive has opened the door to competing
interpretations of its terms, thereby directly undermining the stated
purpose of harmonization of the law.67
into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered."
EEC Directive, supra note 1, at art. 7. The terms "put into circulation" are also
used in Articles 6(1) and 11 of the Directive. Id. at arts. 6(1), 11. The same is true
for Sections 1407b and 1407f of the Draft. Dutch Draft, supra note 2, at §§ 1407b,
1047f.
63 This question is particularly problematic because both the Dutch Draft, and
the Directive contain a clause which makes the law applicable only to those products
which were put in circulation after the respective effective dates of the Draft and
Directive. The clause is found in the Dutch Draft in Section II. The Directive contains
this clause in Article 17.
" Perhaps the answer to these questions can be supplied by reference to Article
3.2 of the Directive which defines a producer as ". .any person who imports for
sale, hire.. .or any form of distribution in the course of his business." Based upon
Article 3.2 it can be argued that the drafters of the Directive were concerned with
"any form of distribution" for purposes of Article 7 as well as Article 3.
61 EEC Directive, supra note 1, at art. 11; Dutch Draft, supra note 2, at § 1407f.
" The Dutch Draft approaches the problem by indicating in the explanatory
memorandum that a product has been circulated when it is available for common
use. Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1985-1986, par. 19,636, no. 3, p. 8 . The Dutch
Draft does not, however, define the term "common use."
6" The EEC Court of Justice can provide a remedy for problems associated with
conflicting interpretations. Courts of the member states can petition the Court of
Justice to provide an interpretation of the Directive and rule on the issue of whether
a Member States national law conforms to the Directive. H. ScHmusMERS, INTER-
NATIONAAL PUBLEEKRECHT VOOR DE REcirrsPRAKTrK 125-8 (1982).
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Similarly, the provision establishing a threshold amount in controversy
for claims involving damage to property other than the product itself
is also a source of ambiguity.6 In the Dutch Draft, if the claim satisfies
the threshold of 500 ECUs, the plaintiff is entitled to compensation
for all of the damages proved at trial, including the threshold amount.
A claim involving less than the threshold amount cannot be founded
upon the provisions of the Dutch Draft. In the French and German
translations of the Directive, however, plaintiffs may only recover an
amount in excess of the threshold set forth in the statute. 69
The Directive defers to the member states' national laws in several
areas, including rights of contribution 7 and suspension of the limitation
period. 7' In addition, the Directive allows the member states to fashion
the applicable law in several critical areas, including whether to allow
a "state of the art" defense7 2 and whether to impose a limit upon
damages caused by "identical items with the same defect. ' 73 Differing
national law with respect to limitation periods and rights of contribution
may result in divergent liability insurance rate-making practices. 74 The
61 Article 9 of the Directive (English version) states: For the purpose of Article
1, 'damage' means: .. .(b) damage to, or destruction of, any item of property other
than the defective product itself, with a lower threshold of 500 ECU,.. ." EEC
Directive, supra note 1, at art. 9. We believe, on the basis of the Directive (Dutch
version) that the drafters intended to establish 500 ECUs as a floor of damages.
The above quoted language can be read to establish 500 ECUs as a ceiling. 500
ECUs is a little more than five hundred dollars, depending upon currency fluctuations.
Tebbens, De Europese Richtlijn Produktaansprakelijkheid, 12 NEDERLANDS
JURISTENLaAD [NJB] 369-374 (1986).
70 EEC Directive, supra note 1, at arts. 5 Uoint and several liability), 8.1 (con-
tribution).
71 Id. at art. 10.2.
72 Id. at art. 15.
71 Id. at art. 16. EEC Directive Article 16 provides in pertinent part that: "Any
Member State may provide that a producer's total liability for damage resulting
from a death or personal injury and caused by identical items with the same defe&
shall be limited to an amount which may not be less than 70 million ECUs." Id.
74 Liability insurance rates depend upon an actuarial process which quantifies the
magnitude of an insured's risk in dollars and cents. Where possible, the calculation
is based upon the insured's history of claims. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTS LiAaiLrry (Final Report of the Legal Study)
1-21-4 (1976). Claim pay-outs, whether through settlement or verdict, should therefore
covariate with liability insurance rates. A statute of limitations of one year should
yield lower rates than a three-year statute of limitations, for a one year statute
would allow for fewer claims. Rules of law governing contribution should also affect
the liability insurance rate-making process because they directly effect insurer claims
experience by either reducing or expanding net insurer payouts. See generally Morris,
Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70
YALE L.J. 554, 560-581 (1961).
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freedom to choose whether to allow a state of the art defense or to
impose limits upon damages for injuries caused by identical products
with the same defect is therefore not consistent with the goal of har-
monization of the law. Indeed, assuming that reduced insurance rates
covariate with competitive advantage in the market place, some member
states may be motivated to take advantage of the terms of the Directive
to shield national producers of products.
By its own terms, the Directive is supplementary to the national law
of the member states. 75 After the effective date of the Dutch Draft, a
plaintiff in the Netherlands will be able to commence a products liability
action and allege claims under the Draft as well as section 1401 of the
Civil Code. The likelihood that plaintiffs will file cases based upon
multiple theories of recovery is great. In France, however, concurrence
of actions is not possible. Under French law, the plaintiff must make
an election between tort and warranty. 76 This type of divergent situation,
combined with the potential for further divergence as a result of poor
drafting and elections by individual member states, may mean that
complete harmonization of products liability law has been postponed
to the distant future.
The Directive is nevertheless a positive step, albeit a cautious one.
In its preamble, the Directive acknowledges that it merely "opens the
way towards greater harmonization." The terms of the Directive there-
fore require the Commission to submit a report to the Council which
summarizes the effect of the Directive on "consumer protection and
the functioning of the common market. ' 77 In addition, the EEC Court
of Justice, at least structurally, has the capacity, if not the inclination,
to ameliorate differences in interpretations of the Directive's terms.78
Although the Directive does not markedly advance the substantive law
of a country like the Netherlands, it may have greater impact on member
states that require strict proof of negligence in products liability actions.79
71 EEC Directive, supra note 1, at art. 13.
7 Boger, supra note 3, at 19.
77 EEC Directive, supra note 1, at art. 16(2).
71 Whereas the national courts of a member state may certify a question arising
in a case to the EEC Court and request an explanation of the EEC Directive or
other EEC legislation, the Supreme Court of each Member State must certify such
questions. See EEC Treaty art. 177(c), 98 Tractatenblad 91 (1957); H. ScHERKERs,
supra note 67.
79 In Italy, the plaintiff must prove fault. See Taschner, Product Liability-Actual
Legislation and Law Reform in Europe, in CONSUMER LAW IN THE EEC 115 (G.
Woodroffe ed. 1984). In regard to England, Weatherill states: "Recovery under the
law of tort, though free of this restriction [privity], so that litigation against a
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It should also be kept in mind that the United States, notwithstanding
numerous attempts, has failed to enact national legislation which would
harmonize products liability law throughout the fifty states. 80
IV. LEGAL CULTURE
Comparison of the Dutch approach to products liability with that
of the United States is difficult for several reasons. 8' The divergent
origins of the substantive law, differences in procedural law, demo-
graphic and economic factors, and differences in social insurance prac-
tices define two distinct legal cultures. In large measure, the common
law in the United States has evolved through the successive application
of both statutory and case law to specific fact patterns, whereas in the
civil law countries, rules and moral precepts, embodied in a code, are
applied to specific cases. This difference in the Dutch and American
legal legacies is arguably the source of divergent popular perceptions
and expectations. The identification and measurement of key perceptions
about the law is beyond the scope of this article. We have limited our
observations to matter that is more easily identified and quantified. It
is noteworthy, however, that relatively recent trends mitigate the his-
torical differences between common law and civil law traditions. The
expansion of the freedom of civil law judges to develop the law through
interpretation of the codeu and the increasing activity of federal and
state legislative bodies reflect a tendency toward uniformity of approach.
manufacturer is possible, is limited by the requirement that the consumer show that
the defendant is at fault in causing her loss." Weatherill, Consumer Safety Legislation
in the United Kingdom, 2 EuiR. CONSUMER L. J. 81,83 (1987). See also Boger, supra
note 3, at 45.
10 Although the United States has not succeeded in enacting federal legislation,
the law governing products liability in the majority of the fifty states is substantially
in accord with the provisions of MUPLA. The United States also has a common
procedural framework with most states having adopted rules of procedure which
are largely modeled upon the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, except for
Louisiana, each of the fifty states shares a common law heritage.
1I The multiplicity of theories of recovery and varying doctrines or interpretations
of doctrine from one state to another show that there is not a uniform body of
substantive law within the United States with which to compare Dutch law. Nev-
ertheless, it is possible to discuss trends in American products liability law in a
manner which allows for comparison with the Dutch Draft and the EEC Directive.
82 See Judgment of June 28, 1984, Rb. Arnhem, 2 TvC. 82, 1985, rev'd, Judgment
of July 7, 1987, Hof Arnhem, 4 TvC. 272. The Upjohn case involving the drug
Halcion is illustrative of the latitude afforded the Dutch judiciary. The trial court's
reasoning in support of its finding that Halcion was not defective was based on an
EEC Directive which had not yet been adopted by the Dutch legislature and on the
fact that other member states continued to allow Halcion to be sold. Id.
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A. Quantitative Factors3
The Netherlands, approximately one-third of the geographic size of
the state of Michigan, has a population of 14.5 million. For every one
hundred thousand people, there are five judges and thirty-three law-
yers." Galanter found almost fourteen times more lawyers per million
and fifty-three times more lawsuits filed per thousand in the United
States than in the Netherlands.85 In 1986 there were 58,404 civil cases
filed in Dutch trial courts.8
The comparative data for products liability cases may be even more
revealing than the data for all case types combined. Data is not available
for products liability case filings in the Netherlands, but in the past
fifty years, there have been no more than twenty-five published opinions
involving allegedly defective products. Only five of these opinions in-
volved an injured consumer as a party plaintiff. Injured consumers
prevailed in two of the five cases. The remaining cases involved em-
ployers, insurers, and professional users as plaintiffsY7 American ex-
perience with products liability litigation is vast. The best estimate in
1976 was that 60,000 to 70,000 cases were being filed annually.8
Substantial differences in civil case filings suggest to some commen-
tators that Americans are too prone to sue. 9 There is certainly no
reason to assume that products manufactured in the Netherlands or
imported into the Netherlands are free of defects; the Netherlands is
not free of accidents. The EEC Commission has stated that a principal
reason for adoption of a Directive on Products Liability is the four
11 In this section we compare the Netherlands with the United States and spe-
cifically with the state of Michigan. Aside from the obvious reason of familiarity,
Michigan was chosen as a basis of comparison because its population, although
smaller than that of the Netherlands, is large enough to make comparison meaningful.
Moreover, Wayne County, Michigan is a very popular venue for products liability
cases.
Verwoerd & Blankenburg, Beroep op De Rechter Als Laatste Remedie, 33 NJB
1045, 1046-47 (1986). Blankenburg found a ratio of 6.5 attorneys per judge in the
Netherlands and 26 attorneys per judge in the United States. He concluded that the
variance was explained by the relatively more active role of judges in the Netherlands.
Id. at 1047.
'5 Galanter, supra note 15, at 52.
MAANDSTATISTIEK RECHTSBESCIERMING EN vEILIGHEID, CENTRAAL BUREAU VOOR
DE STATISTIEK, no. 4 (April 1987).
17 G. SNUDERS, supra note 30, at 150.
" U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 74, at xxxvii. See also Verwoerd &
Blankenburg, supra note 84. The growth in products liability litigation has been
explosive.
19 See Galanter, supra note 15, at 5-8, 51-61.
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to five million accidents and injuries per year in the EEC which involve
defective consumer products. 90 In the Netherlands, the limited data
available indicates that there are approximately 2.3 million home and
leisure accidents per year.9'
Differences in the number of attorneys and the existence of the
contingent fee in the United States are perhaps partial explanations for
the distinct litigation patterns in the two countries. 92 Meaningful com-
parison, however, requires an examination of the incentives and dis-
incentives for, and the structural role played, by litigation in the two
societies. Comparison of the access to courts and to the legal profession,
relative costs, potential rewards, alternative processes of dispute reso-
lution, and alternative compensation schemes may provide a clearer
picture of the context within which products liability rules operate in
each country.
For example, the differences in the number of lawyers may reflect
divergent views on the role of the law in society. The number of Dutch
trial attorneys is deliberately maintained at a relatively small number
through a guild system. In the Netherlands, only a small fraction of
law university graduates actually become certified to practice in court.
The Dutch equivalent of an American trial lawyer is termed an "ad-
vocat." An advocat is a lawyer who is competent to represent clients
in court. To become an advocat, a law school graduate must find an
advocat who will either hire him or allow him to apprentice for a
90 CoMMIssIoN OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY, TEN YEARS OF COMMUNrTY CON-
SUMER POLICY, A CoNmBUTION To A PEOPLES EUROPE 38 (1985).
91 The study was conducted by the Stichting Consument en Veiligheid (Foundation
of Consumer Safety). W. RoOmANs, ERNST EN OMVANO VAN ONGEVALLEN IN DE
PRiVESFEER (1982). For purposes of the study, an accident is defined as an injury
requiring medical treatment. A product was involved in approximately 907o of the
accidents. The research also found, on the basis of user opinion, that product defects
contributed to an accident in approximately 14%o of the cases. Id. at 72.
Typically, the contingent fee and the large number of attorneys in the United
States are cited as factors which distinguish products liability and other personal
injury litigation in the United States from litigation patterns in Europe. See Galanter,
supra note 15, at 55 (With regard to differences in Japanese and American litigation
patterns Galanter concludes: "The real check on Japanese litigation is the deliberate
limitation of institutional capacity: the number of courts and lawyers is kept small.");
Hollenshed & Conway, An Overview: International Products Liability, 16 TRIAL 50,
52 (Nov. 1980) (The authors cite the availability of skilled counsel as a feature
distinguishing American products liability litigation); Malott, Litigation Mentality:
U.S., Europe, Japan, 10 DIRECTORS & BOARDS 14 (1986) (Malott points to the
contingent fee as an important feature distinguishing American from European
products liability litigation patterns).
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period of three years.93 Each year, approximately 2500 persons graduate
from Dutch law schools, but only a small fraction become advocats.
In the United States, all law school graduates who are members of the
bar may lawfully represent clients in court, although many have only
infrequently done so.
B. Procedural Factors
The rules regarding costs and attorney's fees are of principal concern
to a plaintiff in a products liability action. This is particularly true
where complex issues involving the design or composition of products
are involved. Dutch law imposes the burden of paying costs upon the
loser of a lawsuit. These costs are fixed by rule, but do not correspond
with the actual costs and attorney's fees.95 A potential litigant must
therefore assess the likelihood of success against the risk of losing and
thus paying her adversary's costs, a portion of the attorney fees of the
prevailing party, and her own attorney fees.
In addition, procedural obstacles, particularly for complex products
which have not been tested in litigation in the Netherlands or elsewhere, 96
make it difficult for a Dutch litigant inexpensively and expeditiously
to obtain the documents that are crucial to proving negligence and
causation. Dutch procedural law does not provide for the discovery of
documents upon the demand of an adversary or for deposition practices
similar to the procedures provided for in most rules of civil procedure
in the United States. In the Netherlands, the recipient of a request for
93 Stageverordening 1955, Staatscourant [STCT.] 11. The Stageverordening contains
the rules governing the practice of law and admission to the bar association.
94 Based on conversations with individuals employed by the Dutch National Bureau
of Statistics, unpublished data indicate that there were 2,784 graduates of Dutch
law universities for academic year 1985-1986.
' See Rv arts. 56 and 57, Costs include fees paid to the court clerk, filing fees,
fees assessed by expert witnesses and a portion of the attorney fees of the prevailing
party. See generally FOKKEmA & HoNDrus, supra note 21, at 239. Four percent of
Dutch households have insurance (legal aid insurance) which will pay all of the
costs, including attorney's fees. Vos, Nederlandse advocaten en Verzekeraarspartners,
64 ADVOCATENBLAD 370 (1984).
96 Although we know of no litigation where a Dutch attorney was able to avail
himself of the documentary fruits of litigation pursued in another EEC member
state or the United States, the recent filing of more than one thousand dalkon shield
cases by the Consumentenbond in the United States indicates that attorneys and
other interested parties follow litigation filed in venues outside the Netherlands. (The
Consumentenbond is the primary consumer organization in the Netherlands.) This
event is reported in Bogaard & Snijders, Waar Geen Wil Is, Is Geen Wet, SWOKA
Rapport No. 63, pp. 34-35 (1988).
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documents may elect not to produce them. 9 Moreover, a witness can
elect not to respond to oral questions prior to and during trial.98
In the United States, the Torts Restatement § 402A and its progeny
were adopted substantially after the reform of discovery rules. In spite
of the expanded discovery allowable under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and most state rules, it was nevertheless evident that the
burden of proof in a products liability case was too heavy. One of
the principal rationales for the adoption of a so-called "strict liability"
standard was the plaintiff's heavy burden of proof.99 Today, most
commentators agree that a plaintiff in a case alleging a design defect
must prove that an alternative design was feasible which would not
have caused the accident. 0 0 This burden can easily require reconstruction
of the accident which in turn necessitates some understanding of the
operation of the product and its components. Generally, the producer
of a defective product is likely to know far more about the operation
of the product than anyone else. Denial of access to test results, design
drawings and memoranda, and the opinions and statements of the
persons responsible for the creation of the product means that cases
involving simplistic products and obvious defects or cases financed by
organizations are far more likely to reach the Dutch courts.'0'
'7 This procedure sharply contrasts with discovery under the Federal Rules of
Procedure which generally require that an adversary in litigation produce documents.
FED. R. Civ. P. 34. Substantially similar rules govern discovery in all of the fifty
states. Typically, in the early stages of most products liability suits in the United
States, the plaintiff's attorney will make a Request for Production of Documents.
Dutch law does provide for a form of preliminary hearing (voorlopig getuigenver-
hoor). Rv. §§ 876-881. See generally FoKKEmA & HoNDIus, supra note 21, at 249-
54. This procedure is no alternative to open discovery, however, because it is initiated
prior to the filing of an action and is very limited in scope. If it involves a person
or corporation that is likely to become a defendant in a subsequent suit, the person
cannot be required to testify against herself or produce documents that would be
self-incriminating. Legislation is currently pending in the Netherlands which will
allow a party to be called as a witness during a preliminary proceeding and at trial.
See Sec. 214, Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1981, no. 10, p. 8.
91 See Judgment of Feb. 1, 1963, HR, NJ 157 (1964).
99 Greenman v. Yuba Power, Inc., 59 Cal 2d 57,63, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (1963).
00 E.g., Birnbaum, supra note 49, at 648-9; Twerski, supra note 4, at 604-7;
Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. Rnv.
551, 572-3; Hulsen, Design Liability and State Of The Art: The United States And
Europe At A Crossroads 55 ST. Jon's L. REv. 450, 462-75 (1981); Prentiss, supra
note 7, at 694. The Prentiss court, in stating that the test is whether the manufacturer's
design was unreasonably dangerous, cites Owens v. Allis-Chalmers, 414 Mich. 413,
427 (1982). Owens required that the plaintiff prove that a safer design was practical
and feasible.
,0, Compare Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955, 959
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Rules governing damages are also a significant factor in Dutch prod-
ucts liability litigation. Dutch law governing damages for pain and
suffering and the set-off of funds received from collateral sources result
in comparatively reduced verdicts. 1°2 Funds received from social insur-
ance and funds received as a result of private insurance contracts are
not appropriate elements of damages in a civil action. 1°3 The law
governing compensable damages and the comprehensive nature of the
social insurance system mean that there are fewer rewards to be obtained
through litigation.
Section 1406 BW provides for damages in wrongful death actions,
while section 1407 BW governs the damages available to an injured
plaintiff. In wrongful death actions under section 1406, a spouse, child,
or parent has standing to claim damages in a civil action. Compensable
damages are limited to lost income. Pain and suffering and loss of
consortium are not legitimate elements of damages. In cases under
section 1407 BW, the plaintiff may recover damages for pain and
suffering as well as lost wages and damage to property. This difference
with regard to non-material damages is of little import given the rel-
atively few instances in which substantial non-material damages are
recovered. One study of compensation for pain and suffering in the
Netherlands found only about five hundred published and unpublished
judgments during a ten year period where non-material damages were
recovered. °4 Van der Veen compared the amount of damages awarded
for pain and suffering with the magnitude of the injury. In the cases
involving disabling injuries, including total loss of vision, total loss of
hearing, total loss of speech, and total loss of ambulation, the range
of damages for pain and suffering was seventy thousand guilders to
two hundred thousand guilders.1°5 Van der Veen found only one prod-
(1976) (involved a stuck accelerator; whether or not a manufacturing or design flaw
is involved,'"Conditions like these, even if resulting from the design of the products,
are defective and unreasonably dangerous without the necessity of weighing and
balancing the various factors involved.") with Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207
Kan. 2, 484 P.2d 47 (1971)(involved very complex balancing and evaluation of
alternative designs).
102 E.g., Judgment of April 18, 1980, Rb. Groningen, [VR] 4 (1981) (A twenty-
four year old, brain damaged and totally disabled as a result of medical malpractice,
received $50,000); Judgment of February 25, 1981, Rb. Leeuwarden, VR 1 (1984)
(A fifteen year old, brain damaged and totally disabled by a traffic accident, received
$50,000); Judgment of October 5, 1982, NJ 804 (1983) (A twenty-seven year old,
totally disabled and paraplegic as a result of work-place accident, received $50,000).
103 See Asser-Hartkamp I., Zwolle, 8th ed. pp. 386-91 (1988).
104 Van der Veen, Smartegeld, Verkeersrecht 1985, no. 6, p. 121-260.
101 Van der Veen, Smartegeld, Verkeersrecht 1988, No. 6, p. 121-260. In United
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ucts liability case,10 and there, the plaintiff, a bystander who was struck
in the eye by a stone thrown from a lawnmower, sued the user of the
lawinmower rather than the manufacturer.
Under Dutch law, an injured plaintiff who receives funds from social
insurance programs may not recover damages in a civil action for lost
wages and medical expenses already the subject of reimbursement through
social insurance.'°1 Thus, an accident victim who receives social insurance
benefits can only recover uncompensated wages, the value of damaged
property, and non-material damages. Actions to obtain such damages
are referred to as "supplementary actions." In addition, under some
of the social insurance laws, the social insurers have recourse against
the manufacturer of a defective product or other culpable defendants
to the extent of the benefits paid.'10 Under the Dutch Draft, this recourse
is not available to either social or private insurers.
There is little statistical data regarding supplementary actions, but
the literature suggests that such actions are of marginal utilityA°9 One
study of traffic accident victims found that approximately 15% of the
compensation paid to these victims involved settlements with or civil
actions against a culpable party, with more than 50% of this amount
involving compensation for non-material damages." 0 The majority of
the remaining pay-outs involved compensation for property damage."'
Assuming that persons injured in traffic accidents are more likely to
seek redress than consumers injured as a result of a defective warning
or design (because of the burden of proof problem), the adoption of
the Dutch Draft should have little or no impact on products liability
case filings.
United States jury awards, particularly for product liability and mal-
practice claims, contrast sharply with awards in the Netherlands. One
study of jury verdicts in Cook County, Illinois and San Francisco
County, California, which was conducted by the Rand Institute for
Civil Justice, suggests that jury awards in urban venues, particularly
States currency, this is approximately thirty-five thousand to seventy-five thousand
dollars.
106 See Judgment of June 3, 1982, Rb. Zutphen (unpublished).
101 Judgment of November 28, 1969, HR, NJ 172 (1970)(private insurance); Judg-
ment of December 17, 1976, HR, NJ 351 (1977) (social insurance).
,0 See WAO § 90 infra note 18 and accompanying text; ZFW § 83b infra note
17 and accompanying text; ZW § 52a infra note 16 and accompanying text.
109 Bloembergen, De Invloed van Verzekeringen, 9 NJB 182 (1980).
110 Id.
III Id.
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for products liability and medical malpractice claims, have increased
substantially. Median and mean jury awards for products liability and
malpractice cases rose sharply from 1960 to 1984. The median doubled,
and the increase in the mean varied from 200 percent to 1000 percent.
This growth sharply contrasts with the almost constant or declining
mean and median statistics for automobile personal injury cases." 2 The
mean for product liability and malpractice jury awards exceeds
$1,000,000.'" 3 The median statistic exceeds $150,000.14
C. Social Insurance
We contend that the social insurance programs of the Netherlands
reduce the incentive there to pursue products liability claims." 5 The
benefits payable to the victim of an accident and injury in the Neth-
erlands are substantial. Several social insurance programs provide a
comprehensive safety-net for the victims of all accidents. Thus, sus-
tenance for the injured is not based upon the individual assertion of
rights within an adversarial model; rather, the state provides protection
to the victims of accident and injury through statutory law establishing
layers of insurance. The ZW (Ziektewet - Sick Statute)," 6 the ZFW
(Ziekenfondswet - Sick Fund Law),"' the WAO (Wet op de Arbeids
Ongeschtiktheidsverzekering - Workers Disability Act of 1967),118 the
AAW (Algemene Arbeids Ongeschiktheids Wet - The General Act on
Disability of Work)," 9 and the AWBZ (Algemene Wet Bijzondere
Ziektekosten - General Act on Special Medical Costs)' 20 are the principal
social insurance statutes for injured persons. The ZW and the WAO
112 See Hensler, Vaiana, Kakalik & Peterson, Special Report, Trends in Tort
Litigation: The Story Behind the Statistics (Pub. Rand Inst. Civ. Justice) at 14-18
(1987).
113 Id.
14 Id.
11 Empirical support for this proposition is not available. Our argument is therefore
based upon the assumption that the injured victims of defective products, operating
with complete economic information, make choices which maximize their economic
positions. This assumption is flawed in that it is very doubtful that injured consumers
possess such knowledge or always make rational economic choices. There is some
evidence that a number of factors have an impact upon the decision to file a claim
including educational and income levels and the perception that a civil proceeding
is too costly or too risky. See Weatherill, supra note 79, at 8; Galanter, supra note
15 at 13-14.
116 ScHUURMAN & JORDENS, ZWOLLE No. 5 (van Pelt ed. 1983).
117 ScHUURMAN & JORDENS, ZWOLLE No. 95 (Sneep ed. 1987).
'18 SCmxuANs & JORDENS, ZWOLLE No. 162 (Blok ed. 1985).
119 ScHjsURMA & JORDENS, ZWOLLE No. 151 (Blok ed. 1988).
120 Scxua & JORDIENS, ZWOLLE No. 166 (Sneep ed. 1986).
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focus on general disability benefits, and the AWBZ and the ZFW are
concerned with medical costs. The AAW deals with both medical and
general disability benefits.
The ZW, adopted in 1930, provides a fund which is composed of
contributions from employers (5°o of gross income) and employees
(1% of gross income). Under the ZW, an employee is entitled to 70%
of her last earned wage starting almost immediately after the incidence
of accident or sickness. 12 The duration of payment is limited to one
year. For the first six weeks, the employer is required to supplement
the benefits payable under the ZW to 100% of the last earned wage.1 2
In addition, many collective labor agreements provide that employers
will continue the supplement for the entire year of benefits under the
ZW, and in some cases for a second year.'1
If further assistance is needed following the exhaustion of disability
benefits pursuant to ZW, the WAO and the AAW will continue to
provide assistance to the injured victim. The WAO and the AAW
abolished cause-related disability compensation. Compensation for loss
of income up to a rate of 70% is now provided irrespective of the
cause of the disability. The AAW provides a benefit payment to anyone
who is unable to work for more than one year. Benefits under the
AAW are limited and are based upon the extent of disability of an
applicant. Benefits under the WAO are also pegged to a determination
of the extent of disability. An employee who has exhausted her ZW
benefits is entitled to continuing benefits under the WAO upon a finding
that she is disabled. 124 A doctor selected by the board administering
the fund determines disability status. 25 The WAO and AAW provide
the victim of a non-work-related traffic accident with the same pro-
tection as the victim of an industrial accident. The WAO, however, is
2 ZW art. 29.
12 BW art. 1638c.
121 See JASPERS & RIPHAGEN, SOCIAAL ZEKERHEIDSRECHT 39 (1987).
ZW art. 29(52 week limit); WAO art. 19.
125 Until recently, the unavailability of work in the employment market was a
legitimate basis for a finding that a disabled individual was entitled to benefits.
Under the old procedure, experts would evaluate the claimant and determine if any
type of work existed within the range of the disabling impairment. Even if the
experts found that the claimant could perform some type of work, the unavailability
of such work in the employment market rendered the claimant eligible for social
insurance benefits. Recently adopted legislation now limits the ability of claimants
to continue receiving benefits as a result of the unavailability of work within the
range of their work capacities. AAW art. 5 (1986); WAO art. 18 (1986).
[Vol. 18:391
EURoPEAN PRODUCTS LIABILITY DIRECTIVE
limited to employees, as the bulk of the WAO fund consists of employee
contributions.' 2
Medical costs and the costs of rehabilitation are covered by the
AAW, ZFW, and the AWBZ. Under these statutes the costs of normal
medical treatment, extraordinary treatment, and rehabilitation are com-
pensated. The ZFW provides a fund which pays for employee medical
costs such as doctors fees and prescription drugs. The costs of prosthesis,
automobile modification, home remodeling, training, physical adjust-
ments in the work environment, etc., are paid from the AWBZ fund. 27
Comparison of the Dutch social insurance system with the social
insurance system in the United States is complicated by the federalistic
approach to social insurance in the United States. State programs
provide varying levels of benefits in addition to those provided through
the federal social security system. State welfare schemes are excluded
from consideration in this article because they generally are unavailable
to an individual who is already receiving Supplemental Security Income
(SSI)' 28 or Social Security Disability (SSD)129 benefits at a maximum
level.130
The United States federal compensation scheme essentially consists
of the SSI and SSD programs, which extend throughout the United
States. Most states have also enacted Workers' Disability Compensation
legislation and some form of welfare legislation. SSI operates on the
basis of need, whereas SSD is only available to individuals who have
made sufficient payments into the system.' A disabled individual is
eligible for SSI if his annual income does not exceed $1,752.132 SSI
benefits (federal contribution) may reach $340 per month.
121 WAO art. 77.
127 See Peters-Sekino, Product Liability, Tort And Insurance In The Netherlands,
(unpublished paper on file with the Wayne State Law Review) 12, n.5. A forklift
driver injured in a traffic accident received compensation for expenses which included
necessary modifications in his home and automobile his wheel chair, driver's lessons,
and adjustments in the work place necessary to allow him to continue employment.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
129 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
130 The Netherlands also has welfare legislation which provides a family with
approximately 1500 guilders per month. See the Bijstandswet (Public Assistance Act)
Staatsblad 1963, No. 234 and Toeslagenwet (Additional Charge Act) Staatsblad 1986,
No. 562. In addition, each family, irrespective of income, receives a subsidy for
each child in the household. A rent subsidy may be available depending on the
amount of rent and income. In the case of an injured person, should benefits under
the ZW, WAO and AAW not reach the social minimum, additional benefits will
be paid under the Additional Charge Act. See A. JASPERS & J. RIPHAGEN, SOCIAAL
ZEKERHEumsEclr 151 (1987).
131 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.130 (b)(l),(2) (1987).
.1 42 U.S.C. 1382 (a)(1)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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Also, there exists United States federal legislation designed to provide
for the costs of rehabilitating individuals and returning them to the
labor force. The Rehabilitation Act established the Federal Rehabili-
tation Service Administration."' This program provides qualified ap-
plicants with funds for limited adjustments to a home, such as an
access ramp or the purchase of a modified motor vehicle?' Funds for
transportation are only available where the recipient has no other means,
such as suitable public transportation, to travel to and from work. Any
device which is not related to employment is not compensable under
the Act. Thus, personal care items such as beds, in-house lifts, modified
shower stalls, etc., are not compensable under the Act.'35
As noted earlier, benefit levels for workers' compensation vary from
state to state. Generally, the statutes compute benefits as a percentage
of average weekly wage. Many statutes also have established a ceiling
limiting the amount of wages upon which benefits can be paid. Most
state limits are substantially below two-thirds of the average weekly
wage earned prior to the onset of the disabling injury or condition.
Indeed, the majority of the limits are below the standards set by the
National Commission on Workers' Compensation. 36 One study of
workers' compensation benefits in asbestos cases found that the com-
pensation paid was less than 25 percent of gross pre-tax income. 37
Some statutes also limit the duration of benefits. 38 Most workers'
compensation statutes provide for the payment of medical treatment
but do not extend to home, vehicle, and work site modification.
Our limited review of the benefits available in the Netherlands and
the United States suggests that the Dutch system of social insurance
13 9 U.S.C. § 702(a) (1982).
1- 29 U.S.C. § 723(a) (1982).
135 Benefits to support a disabled individual's personal needs may be available
under 29 U.S.C. § 723. This program has never been fully funded by Congress and
operates on an experimental basis. For example, in Michigan, the program is only
available in the cities of Ann Arbor and Port Huron.
'3' See U.S. DEP'T OF COERCE, "supra note 74, at VII 85-86. The National
Commission's standards call for complete reimbursement of medical and rehabili-
tation-related expenditures and payment of two-thirds of income, with a ceiling of
100 percent of a state's average weekly wage. See also J. NACKLEY, PRIMER ON
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 110-115 (1987) (containing tables showing the level of
benefits and ceilings in the United States).
117 W. JOHNSON & E. HELER, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF ASBESTOS-AssOCIATED
DiSEASES, 272 (I. Selikoff ed. 1982); Johnson & Heler, The Costs of Asbestos-
Associated Disease and Death, 61 Mn.BANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 117 (1983).
M' See generally M. FRANKLiN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 776-83 (2d Ed.
1979).
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has a greater scope and provides benefits of a greater magnitude. In
the work environment, a worker may avoid any wage loss for a period
of two years after the occurrence of a disabling condition. In addition,
the devices and training needed to return even the victims of catastrophic
injury to the labor force appear to be more available in the Nether-
lands. 19
In the Netherlands, accident victims are entitled to certain benefits
as a matter of right. This distributive approach contrasts with the
United States where adversarial proceedings involving standardized bar-
gaining play a more prominent role. Studies of the litigation process
in the United States have convincingly established that the filing of a
lawsuit in most cases is a routine step symbolizing that serious bargaining
has commenced. l40 Substantive and procedural rules of law, such as
tort law governing products liability, are sources of individual empow-
erment which allow injured individuals to negotiate compromise so-
lutions which have a cash value.' 4 This adversarial model is prevalent
in the products liability sphere, where a large percentage of the com-
pensation paid by insurers in the United States for product-related
injuries involves accidents within the workplace. "Preliminary ISO data
also indicate that while workers' products liability claims represent only
11 percent of the products liability incidents, these tend to be larger
claims accounting for almost 50 percent of the total insurance pay-
outs. ' 
42
Although the issue requires a more comprehensive study, the com-
parative analysis of social insurance systems suggests that there is less
need to use products liability actions to obtain necessary and sufficient
medical, rehabilitative, and living assistance in the Netherlands. In
139 One area which requires further study involves a comparison of the processes
necessary to obtain benefits in both countries. The relative ease of obtaining relief
through the various programs may be a significant factor in such a comparison.
Workers' compensation and social security in the United States frequently involve
adversarial proceedings and the retention of attorneys.
-40 Most civil suits in the United States result in settlements. See Mnookin &
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE
L.J. 950 (1979); Galanter, supra note 15, at 32-33. Adjudication provides a back-
ground of norms and procedures against which negotiation and regulation in both
private and governmental settings take place. The bargaining endowment which
courts bestow on the parties includes not only the substantive entitlement conferred
by legal rules, but also the rules that enable those entitlements to be vindicated, for
example, a rule excluding evidence favorable to another party or jeopardizing the
claim of a party.
'41 Id.
,, U.S. DEP'T OF COMNMERCE, supra note 74, at VII-85.
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addition, dramatic differences in the rules of law governing employer
liability also may explain the absence of any significant amount of
products liability litigation there. Dutch employers must provide a safe
workplace and are not immune from employee civil actions. The ju-
risprudence involving workplace civil actions is voluminous when com-
pared with products liability-related jurisprudence. Workplace accidents
in the Netherlands generate civil actions against the employer, whereas
in the United States, similar accidents generate third-party claims against
product manufacturers.
A combination of structural and economic disincentives in the Neth-
erlands and structural and material incentives in the United States
explains much of the difference in the patterns of civil case filings.
These incentives and disincentives involve obvious cost factors associated
with attorney's fees and cost-shifting rules, and hidden cost factors
associated with procedural rules and the substantive rules governing
damages.
V. IMPACT OF THE EEC AND DUTCH LEGISLATION
A. Complex Claims
Products liability claims alleging a design defect or the failure to
properly warn and instruct are often far more complex than cases
alleging a manufacturing flaw. Manufacturing defects can be measured
against the standards of the manufacturer and products in the same
product line. Design and warning cases require that some external
standard be utilized in attempting to measure the product or the conduct
of the manufacturer. The EEC Directive defines a defective product
as one which does not provide the safety that a reasonable consumer
is entitled to expect. In adopting this definition, the EEC is signaling
that it endorses a negligence standard for design and warning cases.
For design cases, this approach frequently requires that a plaintiff prove
that a feasible and practicable alternative design was available at the
time the product subject to litigation left the manufacturer's control. 43
143 Birnbaum, supra note 42, at 598. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 74,
at xliii. Notwithstanding the widespread adoption of strict liability approaches in
the United States, the Interagency Task Force stated: "The tort-litigation system
does not, in general, impose absolute liability on manufacturers of products. In
many situations, a jury is asked to balance the economic burden on the manufacturer
to produce a safe product against the probability that the product may cause injuries
and the severity of those injuries." Id.
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Assuming that the Directive requires a plaintiff to carry the burden
of proving negligence, causation, and damages, plaintiffs in the Neth-
erlands will continue to find themselves incapable of adequately assessing
the strength of a particular case prior to the commencement of a civil
action. With complex products such as automobiles, and with the fuel
system integrity issue, both the causation and the negligence issues may
involve extensive, complex proofs that require reconstruction of the
accident sequence, and even the staging of crash tests. Not only the
safety of the product, but also the design process is on trial.' 4 The
capacity to assess a particular case either prior to its commencement
or early in the pretrial phase is therefore an important index of access
to the courts in products liability cases.
Under any substantive rule, except a rule incorporating an absolute
liability standard, the plaintiff must be able to evaluate the defendant
manufacturer's test procedures, test results, alternative designs, etc., as
a necessary part of the negligence calculus. Obtaining early in the
litigation the documents which record these factors is the most inex-
pensive means of evaluating the worth of a particular case. Absent
these documents, a litigant must retain experts to redesign the product
without knowing whether an alternative design was explored by the
producer or whether such a design was feasible or practicable given
the technological limitations and the economics of the marketplace.
This lesson is made clear by the Halcion case. The plaintiffs in that
case would probably not have been able to meet their burden of proof
but for the existence of a document of the defendant Upjohn Cor-
poration. The court of appeals based much of its decision on an Upjohn
memorandum which stated in regard to the 1 milligram tablet, "The
strength is to be deleted to minimize the possibility of the inappropriate
dosing of the product."' 4
The difficulties caused by the relative inaccessibility of relevant doc-
uments are compounded by the absence of any tradition of complex
products liability litigation in the Netherlands. No section of the plain-
tiff's bar has a history of practice in the complex products area, and
no readily available network of attorneys and technical support people
exists to provide consultation and direction for attorneys who require
144 Id.
145 Judgment of July 7, 1987, Hof Arnhem, 4 TvC. 272. This memorandum and
the decision to withdraw the I milligram tablet from circulation arguably involve
subsequent remedial measures which would not be admissible into evidence in the
United States. See FED. R. EvlD. 407.
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assistance.' Thus, even assuming that the attitudes of potential plain-
tiffs are sufficiently ripe for litigation, and that the incidence of accidents
and injury attributable to defective products is frequent, a substantial
number of potential law suits may remain unfiled and unrecognized
by attorneys. 47 It is also noteworthy that most Dutch families purchase
liability insurance.' A comparison of the lesser burden of proof in a
negligence claim against an insured homeowner, with the heavy burden
in a product design claim suggests that, even where recognized, the
products claim will likely not be filed.
By setting forth the "development risk" as a distinct defense, the
Directive sends a confusing signal. If development risk is the same as
consideration of the state of the art, then the separate provision of
Article 7 is redundant. If, on the other hand, consideration of the
development risk is something distinct from consideration of the state
of the art, then defendant producers will be able to raise the state of
technical and scientific knowledge in two contexts. Available technology
will at the time of circulation be a part of the risk-utility balancing
which occurs in cases involving design defects, and subsequent to the
determination that a product is defective, a defendant producer may
then raise the defense that the defect was not discoverable. In many
cases where a plaintiff proves that an alternative design was within the
state of the art, the issue of discoverability of the defect may be moot.
For this reason, the development risk defense logically seems confined
to the areas of drug products and toxic torts. These areas involve
injuries which occur after substantial periods of latency. In such cases,
it is arguable that a producer could not have known of the potential
harm.
It should also be noted that development risk could also be raised
in a case involving a manufacturing defect.1 49 Should the courts of the
- Of the universities in the Netherlands, three offer law courses in products
liability. The existence of a trial bar with technical competence is a major factor
distinguishing America from Europe. Hollenshead & Conway, supra note 92.
-4 For example, lawnmower cases involving a person injured by a projectile are
frequently filed as products liability claims in the United States. Thus, the duty to
properly design appropriate guards and provide proper instructions is well recognized.
In the Netherlands, such injuries are more likely to generate a claim against the
operator of the product.
148 In 1983, approximately 85 percent of Dutch households were protected by
liability insurance. See ASSER-RUTrrTN-HARTKAMP, supra note 21, at 102.
149 See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
The defendant argued that the alleged flaw in a wooden wheel was not discoverable
absent a test which would have destroyed the wheel. See KEETON, OWEN & MONT-
GOMERY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY, CASES AND MATERIALS 47 (1980);
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 145 N.Y.S. 462, 463 (1914).
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member states apply the development risk defense in manufacturing
defect cases, the declaration of strict liability in the preamble of the
Directive would be rendered meaningless.
B. Smaller Claims
Time and money present important obstacles to commencement of
a lawsuit. In addition, significant psychological barriers related to com-
monly held perceptions of the legal process particularly influence small
claim filings by consumers."° The Directive and Draft do not encourage
the filing of small claims. Small claims which are likely to involve less
than $500.00 are excluded. Although potential plaintiffs in the Neth-
erlands still have recourse to suit under existing provisions of the Civil
Code, as has been previously discussed, such claims are not likely to
mature into civil actions in court.
Figure No. 1
Do-it-yourself
5,3% Toys and sweets
Exploding bottles 24,4% Medical drug and health
8,2% Domestic decoration
Domestic143
machineries 93
12,1% Provisions (foodstuffs)
Wash - (and108
cleaning detergent Various
Figure No. 1151 is a pie chart of the claims or grievances accumulated
during a one week campaign by the Dutch Consumer Union, the
Consumentenbond. During April 1985, the Consumentenbond initiated
a one week campaign in which it collected consumer product complaints.
Fifteen hundred complaints were collected, most of which involved
I1o See Francken, 20 Consumentenzaken voor het Kantongerecht, SWOKA ON-
DERZOEKSRAPPORT 53, (1984) (Den Haag); see also Galanter, supra note 15, at 23.
" This graphic is reprinted with the permission of the Consumentenbond. Trans-
lation provided by Peter R. Rodrigues.
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small claims. 15 2 If the distribution of the complaints depicted in Figure
No. 1 is illustrative of the general pattern in the Netherlands, then by
far the largest number of consumer product grievances concern smaller
claims. It is inconceivable that the majority of individuals injured in
some manner by these defective products would shoulder the burden
of pursuing the matter in court, even in the case of a manufacturing
defect. The producers of defective products which are not likely to
cause major injury are therefore often able to completely externalize
the costs of their negligence.
However, in some circumstances the Consumentenbond and the so-
called Complaint Boards may provide injured parties with redress for
small claims. Occasionally, the Consumentenbond will shoulder the
burden of pursuing a producer of a defective product by paying the
legal costs of one of its members. This is done for a limited number
of test cases which involve an interest commonly shared by consumers.'53
Also, in limited instances, the Complaint Boards provide an acceptable
alternative path of redress. Complaint Boards may in some cases be
subsidized by the government. The boards exist primarily in the service
areas.' - Their organizational structures vary: some are sponsored by
industry or trade associations;'55 others were developed through the
joint efforts of trade groups and the consumer unions. 56 The boards
usually confine themselves to contract matters.
In contrast, the District Courts, which generally hear matters involving
5,000 guilders or less,157 do not provide a means of redress for small
claims. The obstacles of time and money preclude access to the courts
by individual plaintiffs. 15 8 Individual persons appear as party plaintiffs
in only 0.7 percent of all of the cases filed in the District Courts.' 59
A draft bill is currently pending in the Tweede Kamer (House of
Representatives) of the Netherlands which would make the District
Courts more accessible by revising the procedural rules. 160
1S2 Aan gebreken geen gebrek, Dossier Produktveiligheid en Produktenaansprak-
elijkheid, Consumentenbond (Apr. 1985).
13E.g., Judgment of February 25, 1986 Rb. Haarlem (unpublished-Eisinga v.
Stichting Diaconessen Ziekenhuis-defective pacemaker).
154 Id.
'" See generally Wegwezer bij Consumentenklachten 9 (1984) (Pub. SER Den
Haag).
156 Id.
'57 5,000 Dutch Guilders are worth approximately $2,500 in U.S. currency.
,51 See Francken, supra note 150.
19 Id. at 57.
,60 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1986-1987, par. 19,976, nos. 1-2.
[Vol. 18:391
EUROPEAN PRODUCTS LIABILITY DIRECTIVE
There has also been some discussion in the Netherlands of repre-
sentative actions which provide organizational standing to sue.16' Dutch
law does not provide for such actions in products liability cases. Re-
cently, the Tweede Kamer adopted a motion calling for the Dutch
Government to enact legislation creating a representative action for
consumer organizations as soon as possible.16 2 Representative actions
based on case law have been limited to claims involving injunctive
relief. For smaller product liability claims, e.g., exploding bottle cases,
expansion of the representative action to provide the Consumentenbond
with standing would greatly expand corporate accountability and con-
sumer protection. Some form of modified class action might also
accomplish these goals with respect to both small and large claims.
CONCLUSION
The Directive, by providing at least a somewhat uniform doctrinal
basis for liability within the EEC, is a step forward. Although case
authority in the Netherlands had already established a strict liability
approach for manufacturing defects, the Directive extends this approach
to countries which still require proof of negligence or rely upon lack
of privity as a limitation. However, uniformity of substantive rules,
even were the Directive to achieve this goal, and we contend that it
does not, is insufficient absent a common framework for discovery.
Common procedural devices which promote relatively inexpensive access
to information in the control of the producers of defective products
are critical to easing the plaintiff's burden of proof. Modification of
Dutch procedural law is the critical element in allowing access to the
courts for products liability claimants where a complex product design
or warning claim is concerned. To the extent that aspects of procedural
law in the Netherlands and other member states restrict the information
discoverable by the plaintiff, the number of products cases reaching
the courts will remain limited notwithstanding the changes brought
about by the Directive. Moreover, variances in procedural law will
probably result in forum shopping and divergent outcomes in substan-
tially identical cases.
161 See Misleading Advertising Act of 1981, Wet Misleidende Reclame, BW §§
1416a-1416c. The new Civil Code also provides that consumer organizations have
standing to pursue class relief in actions involving unreasonable standard terms in
consumer contracts. See Standard Terms Act, Wet Algemene Voorwaarden, NBW
§§ 6.5.2A.1 - 6.5.2A.13.
62 Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1986-87, par. 19,754, no. 6.
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The adoption of the EEC Directive and its incorporation into the
national law of the member states is a guarded step toward the har-
monization of national laws in this area. While providing at least one
somewhat uniform body of black letter doctrine, it opens the door to
contradictory interpretation. In addition, non-uniform procedural prac-
tices and the restricted discovery of documents prior to trial means
that the EEC Directive may have a widely differing impact from one
member state to another. With respect to its express aim of protecting
consumers, the Directive is merely adequate. The Directive and the
Dutch Draft do not substantially further the interests of consumers
involved in either complex or relatively smaller claims. With respect to
the Netherlands, the Directive is not a significant advance beyond the
existing rules of law set forth in the cases construing section 1401 of
the Civil Code. It is arguable that, overall, the promulgation of the
Directive will therefore retard further efforts to increase the level of
consumer protection in the Netherlands.
